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THE LEGISLATIVE FEATURES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
In the following pages I shall speak of the tendency to
incorporate non-constitutional provisions into State consti-
tutions, the legislative features of modern constitutions and
constitutions as codes of private and administrative laws.
Constitutions, as we know them to-day, are of compara-
tively modern origin. In the earliest times, a constitution
did little more than regulate the descent of the Crown. La-
ter, it imposed a few restrictions upon the ruler. These re-
strictions, from which the bill of rights in our Federal and
State constitutions were taken, are Magna Charta, the Petition
of Rights addressed to James II, the Declaration of Rights
made by Parliament at the time it reinstated Charles II, the
Habeas Corpus Act, passed in the same reign, and the condit-
ions imposed upon William and Mary in the Act of Settlement,
1689. No attempt has ever been made in England to restrain
the powers of Parliament. There is no precedent in history
2for our written constitutions. The nearest approach to them
were the charters given to certain trading corporations, doing
business in foreign countries, in the Middle Ages. These
charters provided for a frame of government, governors and
advisory boards, and in many respects were similar to our
State constitutions ; but they were merely trading corpora-
tions, exercising no political powers. (Charter of Merchants
doing business in Flanders, 1463 ; East India Company, 1599 ;
Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1628.)
The first, mention of a truly political written constitu-
tion to be found in English history, is the one proposed by
Sir Henry Vane in his letters to Cromwell during the Protect-
orate. After describing the advantages to be derived from a
written constitution, he recommends that a convention be call-
ed, 'Which convention is not properly to exercise the legis-
lative power, but only to x x x x x agree upon the particu-
lars that by way of fundamental constitutions shall be laid
and inviolably observed as the conditions upon which the whole
body so represented doth consent to cast itself into a civil
and political incorporation.' (Vane's Letters -- 'Th&
Qustion' -- The Nation, Vol. 45, p. 166.)
The constitution adopted by the United States, and the
earlier ones adopted by the States, contain merely a frame
of government, and a few safeguards for civil and political
rights. In these early instruments we find nothing but the
fundamental principles of organic law and the distribution of
the powers of government. There are no restrictions upon
the legislature. The executive powers were meagre. The
governor could not veto bills. The people, as sovereign, re-
served no powers to themselves. The legislatures, as their
direct representatives, were practically unlimited. They
elected the governors, appointed the judges and made all chan-
ges in the constitution, without referring them to the people
for their ratification. Of the thirteen original States, on-
ly Massachusetts submitted her constitution to the people for
their approval or rejection. Allowing the people to take a
direct part in the making of the laws, through the medium of
the constitution, is of gradual growth. The first change
came about in 1821, when the right to pass upon a new consti-
tution was first acknowledged in New York. Property quali-
fication for the right of franchise was next abolished in
different States. The legislatures were soon deprived of
the right to elect the governors. The voters asserted their
right to elect the judges. The will of the people began to
be consulted upon all matters of importance. Of the one
hundred and twelve constitutions adopted since 1789, only twen-
ty have taken effect without first having been submitted to
the people. Nineteen of the twenty were adopted either pri-
or to 1820, or during the late civil war ; the remaining one
being that of Mississippi, adopted in 1891.
To fully appreciate the part taken by the people in the
enactment of their laws, in their vote upon the adoption of a
constitution, it must be remembered that the measure to be
voted upon curtails the power of the legislature, and limits
its existence ; that the instrument contains not only the
outline of a frame of government, but is a code of laws with-
in itself, legislating, often in detail, upon almost all im-
portant subjects ; and that its adoption is usually made a
party issue, and is exhaustively discussed by the press and
public speakers before the election.
As the people seized upon this method of taking part in
the enactment of their laws, ordinary private and administra-
tive laws began to be incorporated in the constitutions, ne-
cessitating frequent changes and amendments. Louisiana and
Georgia have each had seven constitutions ; South Carolina,
Arkansas and Virginia have each had five new constitutions,
besides numerous amendments. Besides this, the increase in
length of these instruments, in the last half century, has
been almost fourfold. Constitution making has become noth-
ing more than a cumbrous mode of legislation, changing as of-
ten as important statutes. Or, as Mr. Woodrow Wilson ex-
presses it, 'The non-constitutional provisions which are be-
coming so comnon in our State constitutions are virtually only
ordinary laws submitted to popular sanction and so placed a-
long with the rest of the instrument of which they form an
incongruous part, beyond the liability of being changed other-
wise than through the same ultimate authority.' (The State,
Sec. 896.)
As the tendency to burden constitutions with ordinary
laws increases, there have been corresponding restrictions
placed upon the legislature. Within the last half century
the constitutions of many States have changed the time of hold-
ing legislatures from annually to bi-annually. In others,
the time has been limited from 90 to 40 days. They have tied
the hands of the legislature with regard to special legisla-
tion upon almost all subjects. The legislature is almost
universally forbidden, by special legislation, to open or va-
cate highways ; to give effect to informal deeds or wills ;
to drain swamp lands ; to change the laws of descent ; to
create or impair wills ; to regulate interest on money ; to
declare minors of age ; to grant divorces ; and to grant to
corporations exclusive privileges. Special legislation for
making internal improvements is forbidden in most of the West-
ern States. The legislature may not change or locate a coun-
ty seat, provide for the bonding of cities and towns, or in
any way regulate the affairs of municipalities. Neither can
the legislature grant compensation to officers or contractors
after service is rendered ; not refund money paid into the
State treasury ; nor release persons from debt to state or
city ; nor restore citizenship to one convicted of crime, or
change the name of any one ; nor create corporations by spe-
cial act. This last provision is absolute in many of the
States, while in others it is limited to cases where the cor-
poration might be created under a general law. An examina-
tion of the different State constitutions will show that there
are nearly seventy-five subjects upon which special legisla-
tion is forbidden. None of the constitutions contain them
all. That of Missouri (1875) contains thirty-three inhibit-
ions upon legislation. Kentucky's new constitution (1890)
has twenty-nine. So many prohibitions argue a want of con-
fidence in the representatives on the part of the people.
In regard to corporations, State constitutions are very
full and explicit. Their rapid increase in numbers, their
wealth, power and influence has had much to do with this. The
people cannot trust their general asemblies to grapple alone
and unassisted with a being having 'perpetual succession and
without a soul.* (Coke on Lit. 250.) Especially is this
so since the decision in the Dartmouth College case (4 Wheat-
on, 518), holding that the charter of a corporation is a con-
tract between the State and the corporation and cannot be re-Q /
servation of such right in the constitutioA. Though not a
fundamental principle of organic law, ana could as effectually
be embraced in a statute, yet the constitution of almost ev-
ery State in the Union declares that the term 'corporation'
shall include joint stock companies, whenever they have any
privileges not possessed by individuals ; that they shall be
limited to the business for which they were created ; and
that foreign corporations must have an authorized office and
an agent in the State, upon whom process may be served. (Pa.,
Ark., Col., Ala., La., &c., &c.) In Alabama and Colorado
the constitution provides that suit may be brought against a
corporation in any county in which it does business. In Ohio
and Kansas the constitution makes each stockholder liable to
a further sum equal to the amount of his stock. The consti-
tution of Michigan makes each stockholder individually liable
for all labor performed for corporations. By the constitu-
tions of New York, Indiana, Illinois, &c., the stockholders
in banking corporations are individually liable to the amount
of their stock. But the constitutions of five States declare
that stockholders shall in no case be liable otherwise than
for unpaid stock. The constitutions of Nebraska, West Vir-
ginia, Oregon, Alabama, Connecticut and California make di-
rectors liable for all moneys embezzled by any officer of a
corporation. The constitutions of Pennsylvania, Missouri,
Arkansas, Texas, Colorado, Alabama and Louisiana forbid cor-
porations to issue watered stock. And if they do issue stock
other than for property, labor performed,or money actually
paid, such stock is void ; and in Louisiana the company for-
feits its charter. By the constitutions of Michigan and Del-
aware it is provided that charters shall not be granted to
corporations other than municipal, and canal and railroad com-
panies, for a longer period than thi-rij years.
Many of the State constitutions prohibit competing or
parallel railroad and telegraph companies from consolidating,
or the one company owning stock in the other. (Pa., Ark.,
Texas, Ala., Ill., Mich. and others.) The rolling stock of
railroad companies is declared personal property, and the
general assembly can pass no laws exempting it from execution.
(Ill., Neb., W. Va., Ark., Mo. and Texas.) As a guard a-
gainst undue influence of railroad companies on representa-
tives, they are forbidden to accept passes, by the constitu-
tions of many of the Western States. The constitution of
West Virginia compels all railroads to build depots at towns
within half a mile of the road. In Illinois, a majority of
the directors of a domestic corporation must reside in the
State. The legislature is not allowed to limit the amount
that may be recovered for wrongful death, in Pennsylvania and
other States. In two States the constitution makes it a
crime for an officer of a bank to receive deposits, or create
debts for the bank, after knowledge of its insolvency or its
being in a failing condition, and such officer is made person-
ally liable for the amount of the debt or deposit. (Mo. and
La.) In South Carolina the constitution makes it a penal
offense for a bank officer to borrow money from the bank.
The people, through their constitutions, have in sixteen
States provided for homesteads exempt from execution. In
nineteen they have provided the method of claiming, and the
amount of personal property that shall be exempt from execu-
tion. Though it is certainly not a principal of fundamental
law that a married woman's property should be free from the
control and not liable for the debts of her husband, yet this
subject has been taken from the hands of the legislature and
placed in the constitutions of fourteen States. Jealous of
long tenures, the people of Michigan and Delaware have, by
their constitutions, declared leases with rent reserved for
a longer time than twelve years void. In the new Western
States, where public lands are plentiful, not satisfied to
leave to the wisdom of the legislature the protection of the
public domain, and to preserve it from land sharks, provision
is made in the constitution that such lands can be sold only
to actual settlers, prescribing the amount of land that may be
granted, and the length of time the settler must hold before
he can perfect his title. In others, mining lands are regu-
lated and forests are protected. To avoid competition be-
tween honest and prison labor, the people have had placed in
the constitution laws prohibiting mechanical trades being
taught to convicts, except for the manufacture of articles not
produced in the State. (Constitution of Mich.) The func-
11
tions of the constitution are extended to embrace usury laws,
and prescribe the legal rate of interest, in five States. The
constitution of Arkansas abolishes all private seals except
corporate seals.
For the better protection of the cestui uD trusts, pro-
visions have been inserted in modern constitutions prescribing
the methods and securties in which trust funds shall be in-
vested. Lotteries are almost universally forbidden. Mar-
riage and divorce are regulated by the constitutions. The
constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts legitimatize cer-
tain classes of children. The constitution of Illinois de-
clares what shall be a public workhouse, and that common car-
riers must weigh or measure grain at the place where it is
received, and are made responsible for the delivery of the
full amount. The constitutions of Texas and Louisiana make
provisions for the licensing of medical practitioners, and
for the punishment of malpractice. In three States consti-
tutional provision is made for mechanics' and laborers' liens.
(N. C., Texas and Col.) Poor-houses, insane asylums and
schools for the blind are subjects of constitutional legis-
lation in several States. In four States the constitution
provides for the 'code o procedure. / (N. C. , Ohio, Neb. and
12
S. C.) In Michigan the constitution abolishes the distinct-
ions between between proceedings at law and in equity. In
New York and Wisconsin, it is provided that testimony in equity
cases shall be taken in the same manner as at law. The con-
stitution of North Carolina abolishes feigned issues. In
four States, judges are not allowed to charge juries as to
matters of fact. (Ark., Texas, Col. and S. C.) The cons-
titution of Kansas makes provision for the custody of children
after the divorce of their parents. Intermarriages between
the whites and negroes are forbidden in North Carolina and
Tennessee. In Oregon the people have declared, through their
constitution,that the Chinese shall neither own real estate
nor work mining claims. They are not allowed to vote either
in California or Oregon. Under the constitutions of four
States women may hold offices pertaining to public schools.
(Pa., Minn., La. and Col.) By the constitution of Illinois
each elector may cast as many votes for any one candidate as
there are officers to be elected. The same constitution al-
lows shareholders at corporate elections to cast all votes for
any one candidate or distribute them as he pleases. Like
provisions have since been adopted in Missouri, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, Nebraska and California.
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The legislative features of constitutions so far spoken
of are those where the law itself has been directly incorpor-
ated into and forms a part of the constitution. But many of
the recent State constitutions contain provisions similar to
the Swiss referendum, reserving to the people the right to
pass upon and ratify all proposed laws upon certain subjects.
Before noticing their provisions in detail, it may not be out
of place to speak briefly of the referendum as adopted in oth-
er countries.
It has long been the custom in certain cantons of Switz-
erland for the representatives to formulate and propose legis-
lation, which only becomes the law of the land after having
been referred to the people and ratified by them. In some
cantons this was compulsory ; in others, the people had a
right to demand that all laws should receive their sanction
before becoming obligatory. In the smaller provinces, the
people met = masse for expressing themselves upon their laws
in the larger provinces, the vote was taken by ballot. Pre-
vious to 1874 the referendum was local or confined to certain
cantons. By the constitution adopted in that year, it be-
came a part of the national system. At present a popular
vote may be demanded upon all federal as well as local laws,
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not of immediate necessity. The national constitution con-
tains the following guaranty : 'Federal laws as well as fed-
eral decrees, if not of an urgent nature, must be submitted
to popular vote, upon demand of 30,000 qualified voters, or
eight cantons.' (Constitution of Switzerland, Ch. II. Art.
89.) During the first twelve years after the adoption of
the constitution, the referendum was demanded upon nineteen
laws, only six of which were ratified by the voters. (Morse's
'Federal G of Switzerland", p. 119.) They have de-
manded this right twenty-four times in the sixteen years since
the privilege was extended to them. (American Academy of
Political and Social Science (Nov. 1891), p. 36.)
The constitution of France, framed by the extreme demo-
cratic convention after the revolution of 1789, contained a
like provision --- 'Any law proposed by the legislative body
shall be published and sent to all the communes of the repub-
lic, to be voted upon, provided objection has been made to
such proposed law." In England, of recent years, the same
influence has made itself strongly felt. An illustration,
is the custom of referring laws that affect only local inter-
ests to the direct vote of the citizens of that district ;
as, local option laws, laws to raise funds for free libra-
15
ries, hospitals, &c. Another more important illustration
It is now maintained as a constitutional doctrine that when
any important measure changing established customs or the cons-
titution is passed by the House of Commons, the House of Lords
have a right to reject it, for the purpose of compelling a
dissolution of Parliament, that an appeal may be taken to the
voters. (Brice's Amrian.Commoneath, Vol. I. p. 449.)
The author speaks of this as the phenomena of recent years.
Belgium is at present looking to the referendum as a means of
political reform. (American Academy of Political and Social
Science (Nov. 1891), p. 55.)
It has long been the custom in this country for State
constitutions to require legislation upon certain subjects to
be submitted to the voters and approved by them before it be-
comes law. The first instance of this American referendum
appeared in an amendment to the constitution of Michigan, rati-
fied in 1843, which declared that all legislation- contract-
ing State debts, except certain debts specified in the consti-
tution, should be submitted to popular vote. Similar provis-
ions have been incorporated in nearly all constitutions since
adopted. Kentucky's constitution, adopted in 1891, has the
following clause : *No act of the general assembly shall au-
16
thorize any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Comnonwealth
except for the purposes mentioned in Section 49 x x x x nor
shall such act take effect until it shall have been submitted
to the people at a general election and shall have received a
majority of the votes cast for and against it.' (Sec. 50.)
To protect themselves against loss from the insolvency of
banks, the people in many of the Western States have reserved
to themselves the right of passing upon all acts creating
banks. The constitution of Missouri contains the following
clause : "No act of the general assembly creating corpora-
tions with banking powers shall go into effect or in any man-
ner be enforced, unless the same shall be submitted to a vote
of the qualified voters of the State and be approved by a ma-
jority of the votes cast at such election.' (Art. XIV. Sec.
26.) There are like provisions in the constitutions of six
other States. The constitution of Montana contains another
instance of law making direct by the people ; it provides
that the rate of taxation for State purposes shall never be
greater than three mills on each dollar, and when the taxable
property in the State shall exceed $300,000,000, the rate
shall not exceed one and one-half mills on each dollar of val-
uation: But the above rates may at any time be increased by
an act passed by the legislature for that purpose, provided
the same is ratified by a majority of the votes at the next
general election. (Art. XII. Sec. 9.) The constitutions of
Colorado and Idaho contain similar provisions.
There are many other referendums found in the different
State constitutions, such as prohibiting the legislature from
changing the seat of government without the consent of the vo-
ters (found in sixteen States) ; and prohibiting the sale of
canals, school lands and other public property, unless such
sale is ratified by the people. (Constitution of Ill. Art.
X ; Constitution of Kan. Art. VI.) The voters of Montana
were required to determine whether the right of suffrage should
be extended to women. The constitution declares that the
legislature shall draft a law extending to women the right of
suffrage, and submit it to the voters for their ratification
or rejection. (Art. VII. Sect. 2.) Like provisions are
contained in the constitutions of Colorado and Wisconsin. The
location of State colleges, universities, asylums, prisons and
all other State institutions must be submitted to popular vote,
in Wyoming. (Constitution of Wy., Art. VI. Sec. 50.) Lo-
cal option, or the right of the inhabitants of certain limits
of territory to determine whether intoxicating liquors shall
be sold in such territory, is a right given by many State
constitutions.
By an amendment to the constitution of California, adop-
ted in 1887, city charters and all amendments thereto must be
submitted to the people for their ratification. The same
amendment provides that city and county governments may be
consolidated and merged into one. As there is nothing in
the State constitution preventing the incorporation of ordi-
nary municipal ordinances into city charters, this may be
said to be the nearest approach to a republican form of mu-
nicipal government ever attempted in this country. The cons-
titution of Washington has a like provision, except that it
gives the legislature no power to reject city charters. (Am-
erican Academy of Political and Social Science (Nov. 1891),
p. 53.) The general assemblies of several of the States,
in order to evade responsibility, have at different times sub-
mitted proposed legislation to popular vote, without express
constitutional authority. Such legislation has usually been
held unconstitutional. (Rce_ v. F , 4 Har. (Del.), 479 ;
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, 418.) Though in Il-
linois it has been held valid.
The courts of this country cannot declare a statute void
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because it is unjust, contrary to natural justice or violates
the principles of republican liberty, unless such legislative
encroachment is forbidden by a provision of the constitution.
This seems to be one of the reasons for placing so many limi-
tations and restrictions upon the powers of the legislature.
(Commonwealth v. Mflokey., 2 Rawle (Pa.), 374 ; 6 Ind. 515
Pennsylvania . R. LQ.. v. giblet, 66 Penn. 164 ; 13 Grat.
(Va.), 98 ; Cooley's 'Constitutional LawI, p. 154. Conta,
Gardner v. _l of flbu, a Johns. Ch. 162.) Some meth-
od of avoiding conflicts between the constitutions and stat-
utes was deemed necessary very early in the history of this
country. The first constitution of Massachusetts (1780) con-
tained a clause giving the governor and general assembly the
right to require the written opinion of the judges upon the
constitutionality of proposed legislation. (Part II. Chap.
III. Sec. 3.) The constitutions of several other States con-
tain similar provisions. (Me., N. H., R. I., Fla. ; and
that of Mo., 1864, but not in the present.) The courts have
been naturally very reluctant to pass upon matters thus sub-
mitted to them, and their opinions under such circumstances
have not been considered authoritative or binding upon the
courts. The constitutionality of a measure under consider-
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ation by the senate of New Hampshire, in 1852, was submitted
to the court. The court, said, 'Whatever opinion we may ex-
press upon this bill must be regarded as an impression, by
which we shall not feel ourselves bound if the measure shall
become a law and the rights of citizens shall depend upon its
construction.' (25 N. H. 537.) The same view has been
taken in all other States having a like provision, with the
exception of Maine. (126 Mass. 546 ; 5 Metcalf, 597 ; 126
Mass. 566 ; 58 N. H. 622 ; 60 N. H. 585 ; 70 Me. 583 ; 55
Mo. 295 ; 58 Mo. 369.) In 1793, President Washington re-
quested the opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court upon
questions not being litigated, arising under the laws and
treaties of the United States. The court refused to express
an opinion. (Sparks's 'Life _of WaLin on.', Chap. X.)
The want of some satisfactory means of preventing antago-
nism between constitutions and State laws is another reason
for encumbering State constitutions with so many legislative
features. While the advantages to be derived from this meth-
od of legislation are not inconsiderable, the evils resulting
from the change of constitutions to codes of law are apparent.
Some of the advantages are these : A fow sel tz rop ies-e-
ft#A-ves -n oiatmr3ntlgntyhfatAe ia-s-es-. Cons-
titutional conventions are usually composed of more intelli-
gent and representative men than legislatures. It, has always
been considered an honor to be a member of such a convention,
and the position has usually been sought and filled by the
best men. As a result, their work has been more satisfact-
ory. There is a lack of haste and looseness of draft, char-
acteristic of modern legislation. The effects of constitu-
tional provisions are more thoroughly considered by their au-
thors, than ordinary laws originating with the legislature.
Thus, it secures stability in laws, causes the citizens to
take more interest in the affairs of the government, educates
the masses to a certain extent, keeps them in closer touch
with the government, makes them better citizens and makes them
better qualified to take part in the government.
But, the evils far outweigh the good. The practice of
encumbering constitutions with laws and special restrictions
has fettered and degraded the legislature, weakened their au-
thority and hampered them on all sides. It often prevents
them from correcting abuses and carrying into effect needed
reforms. Questions legitimately belonging to the legisla-
ture, needing much thought, consideration and discussion, are
taken from it and placed in an instrument whose adoption or
rejection is to be determined by men who have not the means
of thoroughly considering the matter, and too often depend
upon the whim of public opinion or the arts of demagogues.
Not only is the responsibility of the legislature lessened,
but it is embarrassed in its workings by being met at every
turn by questions of its competency to legislate. As a re-
sult, it work is often loosely done, unsatisfactory, and the
courts are crowded with suits for the construction of statutes
and to pass upon their constitutionality. Another objection
to placing ordinary laws in constitutions is that it makes
them permanent and difficult of change. In this way objec-
tionable and injurious laws may become a part of the juris-
prudence of a State. Progress is change. Sir Henry Maine
says, "Social necessities and social opinions are always more
or less in advance of law. Law is stable, and society is
progressive ; there is always a gap between them. The great-
er or less happiness of a people depends upon the degree of
promptitude with which this gulf is narrowed." (Hitchcock's
'Am State Constitutions", p. 7.) This gulf cannot be
rapidly closed when laws are placed in constitutions.
The courts of last resort, of the different States, have
often pointed out the inexpediency of the people's passing di-
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rectly upon the laws. In the case of ic v. Fser (4 Har.,
Del., 479), the legislature of Delaware attempted to pass a
law and refer it to the people for their ratification or re-
jection, without constitutional authority. The court said :
vNeither the legislative, executive nor judicial departments
x x x x can devolve on the people the exercise of any of
the sovreign powers with which each is invested. The powers
of the government are trusts of the highest importance, on the
faithful and proper exercise of which depend the happiness and
welfare of society, and in no case whatever can it be dele-
gated or transferred to any other persons, or to the whole
people of the State. If the legislative functions can be
delegated to the people, so can judicial and executive powers.
The absurd spectacle of a governor referring it to a popular
vote whether a criminal convicted of a capital offense should
be pardoned or executed, would be the subject of universal
ridicule. And were a court of justice, instead of deciding
a case themselves, to direct the clerk to enter judgment for
the plaintiff or defendant, according to the popular vote of
the county, the country would be disgusted with the folly, in-
justice and iniquity of the proceedings. /All wIll admit that
in such cases the people are totally incompetent to decide
24
correctly. Equally incompetent are they to exercise with
discernment and discretion, collectively or by the ballot box,
the power of legislation. Because, under such circumstances,
passion and prejudice incapacitate them for deliberation.
(Jameson's 'Constitutional Conventions', p. 421.)
Again, in the case of Thorn v. haramr. (
Barbour, 102), the validity of an act establishing free schools
throughout the State of New York was in question. The liti-
gation arose over a section declaring that the 'electors shall
determine by ballot, at the annual election to be next held,
whether this act shall or not b o law.' Though the pro-
posed law received the sanction of more than a majority of
the votes, the court held it void, among other things saying :
'The doctrine that no harm can result from allowing the people
to exercise directly the law making power, is more plausible
than sound. We think it might be easily shown that some of
the very worst evils must necessarily flow from such a viola-
tion of fundamental law. The law making power has been wise-
ly deposited in the hands of a limited number of chosen men.
The voters may have discretion enough to select suitable men
for the offices ; but if they were put directly to the busi-
ness of law making themselves, they would be quite out of
their element. If the two Houses can divest themselves of
their office of law making and devolve it upon the people,
what security have we against the passage of laws, perhaps
well meant, but liable to be glaringly wrong because incon-
siderately adopted ? If the practice be sanctioned x x K xx
every case of doubtful propriety will be referred to the re-
sult of a ballot, and acts of the assembly, subject to the
popular vote, will be yielded to the claims or partisan impor-
tunities by faithless legislators anxious t eape the rep-
sibility of.- their D-o-sat±.n' (oaidley v. Baker, 15 Barb. 122;
PaoQp1e v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343 ; 5 W. & S. (Penn.) 281 ; 4
Selden (N. Y.), 483. Contra, ith v. Bryan, 5 Gilm. (Ill.),
1.)
The argument of the above cases applies as well to in-
stances where the people are allowed to make their laws by
inserting them in their constitutions, as where they are al-
lowed to pass upon them without constitutional authority.
Where the constitution empowers the legislature to divest
itself of responsibility, or to refer its labors to the people,
or where the laws are embodied in the constitution itself, of
course, there can be no question as to their validity ; but
it makes it none the more advisable. The stamp of legality
does not add to the wisdom of this method of legislation.
The convention of November, 1890, that framed the present
constitution of Mississippi passed an ordinance at the same
time regulating the times and method of holding elections,
adopted the Australian ballot system, and prescribed in de-
tail the means by which the same should be carried into ef-
fect. The legislature is forbidden to repeal or in any way
change this ordinance prior to 1896. This ordinance is noth-
ing but an ordinary law, enacted without the consent of eith-
er branch of the legislature, and not subject to the veto pow-
er of the governor, and curtails the powers of future legis-
latures. The convention that framed the constitution of
Arkansas of 1861, passed an ordinance, in connection with the
constitution, to provide revenue for the State. The validi-
ty of certain bonds issued under this ordinance was question-
ed in the case of Brgg. v. Tuffs (49 Ark. 561), in 1887. The
court held them void, among other things saying : 'A conven-
tion called to frame a new constitution has no inherent right
to legislate about matters of detail. All the powers that
it possesses are such as have been delegated to it by express
grant or by necessary implication. The passage of an ordi-
nance to raise revenue was an assumption of power by the con-
vention, and has never been ratified by the people.*
The practice of filling constitutions with ordinary laws
and limitations upon the legislature was at first resorted to
by the people as a means of retaining as much power to them-
selves as possible, as the instrument was referred directly
to them for their ratification ; but there is danger of this
becoming means of oppression rather than of relief. The cons-
titution of Mississippi, adopted in 1890, not only contains
many provisions that should have been left to the legislature,
but it also disfranchises a large per cent. of its citizens,
and does this without their consent, and without its being
referred to the voters for their sanction. The legislature
of Kentucky, in 1891, passed an act calling a constitutional
convention, and provided that before the constitution should
become operative it should be referred to a popular vote and
be ratified by a majority of those voting. After framing the
constitution, the convention referred it to the people, and
it was ratified ; subsequently, the convention reassembled
and made numerous alterations of the constitutions, several
material, and promulgated the instrument as changed as the
constitution of Kentucky. The validity of this proceeding
was contested, and the matter carried to the Court of Appeals
(Miller v. Johnson, S. W. Rep.), where it was sustained, on
the ground that it was a political rather than a judicial ques-
tion.
There seems to be no adequate relief against irregulari-
ties in constitution making. (LAl.. v. Bain, 75 Penn. 46 ;
Mi v. ,S. W. Rep./.,- Constitution of Miss., 1865 ;
Ark., 1874 ; La., 1852 ; Mo., 1865.) Therefore, a short,
concise, written constitution, containing merely the fundamen-
tal law of the State, regulating the exercise of sovereign
powers, directing to whom these powers shall be confided and
the manner of their exercise, seems to be the best suited to
our conditions ; or, as Judge Cooley expresses it (23 Ameri-Wj F
can Law Review,), 'Of all the constitutions which a people
makes for itself, the best is that which is written with a
close hold on the past, but which with foreseeing eye prepares
the way for appropriating the lessons of a progressive future.
Only such a constitution can embody the essential excellences,
and can so far harmonize the conservit.ive and the progressive
principles, that the one will become the complement of the
other in steadily, but cautiously and safely, moulding the
instrument to greater perfection.'
